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ABSTRACT
Effective Planning for Seismic Risk: Case of Kobe, Japan
By Mami Itamochi
This thesis discusses the city of Kobe’s recovery from the Great Hanshin
Earthquake from the perspective of city planning. The earthquake and fire devastated many
established parts of the city, impacting housing, businesses, and community institutions,
resulting in a need for coordinated planning of of rebuilding.

The purpose of this research is to investigate effective planning techniques for
seismic risk, using Kobe, Japan as a case study. My research examines a neighborhood
where a new plan was developed after the earthquake. It also describes how Kobe is
dealing with the massive loss of housing and town resources.
After this devastating earthquake, people in Kobe tried to have new urban districts
which have wider roads, more open spaces, and fire proof buildings.

ACKNOLEDGEMENT
The following people were all extremely generous with their time and thoughts
when I was working on this research. In particular, DR. Sarah Brinegar from Marshall
University went far out of her way to help me.
Dr. Sarah Brinegar, Marshall University
Dr. James Leonard, Marshall University
Professor Larry Jarrett
Professor Masaya Kobayashi, Kobe University
Mr. Takashi Yamashita, Urban Planning Bureau, Hyogo Prefecture
Mr. Yosuke Ikenaga, City Planning Bureau, Kobe City

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………………….ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS……………………………………………………………………iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………………………iv
LIST OF FIGURE…………………………………………………………………………...v
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………………..vi
CHAPTER I…………………………………………………………………………………..1
Introduction………………………………………………………………………..1
CHAPTER II…………………………………………………………………………………3
Review of Literature……………………………………………………………..3
Study Area Kobe, Hyogo Prefecture, Japan……………………….…3
Seismic Risk……………………………………………………………..5
Urban Planning………………………………………………………….10
Hanshin Awaji Earthquake……………………………………………..18
CHAPTER III…………………………………..……………………………………………26
Methodology……………………………………………………………………..26
Research Design………………………………………………………..26
The Interviewees………………………………………………………..27
CHAPTER IV……………………………………………………………………………….29
Results…………………………………………………………………………….29
Kobe City Recovery Plan……………………………………………….29
Temporary Housing……………………………………………………...33
District Planning………………………………………………………….37
CHAPTER V………………………………………………………………………………..43
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….43
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………47

iv

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Destructive Earthquakes Occurring in Japan in the 20th century…………………7
Figure 2 Around Japan Map…………………………………………………………………….9
Figure 3 Areas of Kobe Wards Experiencing Magnitude 7 Shaking……………………..19
Figure 4 Burnout Area by Kobe Ward……………………………………………………….22
Figure 5 Loss of Housing Units………………………………………………………………24
Figure 6 Land Readjustment Process……………………………………………………….39
Figure 7 Land Readjustment in Nagata Ward………………………………………………39

v

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Earthquake Victims by Kobe City Wards…………………………..…20

vi

Chapter I
Introduction
On Tuesday, January 17, at 5:46 a.m. local time, the Hanshin Awaji
Earthquake of magnitude 7.2 (Mj) struck the region of Kobe and Osaka in south-central
Japan. This region is Japan’s second-most populated and industrialized area, after Tokyo,
with a total population of about 10 million. The magnitude 7.2 earthquake occurred a
shallow depth on a fault running from Awaji Island through the City of Kobe, which in itself
has a population of about 1.5 million. Strong ground shaking lasted for about 20 seconds
and caused severe damage over a large area (Kobe Newspaper 01/23/1995, Japan 21st).
Nearly 5,500 deaths have been confirmed, with the number of injured people
reaching about 35,000. Nearly 180,000 buildings were badly damaged or destroyed, and
officials estimate that more than 300,000 people were homeless on the night of the
earthquake.

The life loss caused by the earthquake was the worst in Japan since the

1923 Great Kanto Earthquake, when about 140,000 people were killed, mostly by the
post-earthquake conflagration. The economic loss from the 1995 earthquake may be the
largest ever caused by a natural disaster in modern times. The direct damage caused by
the shaking is estimated at over 13 trillion yen (about U.S.$147 billion) (Copper 1995).
This does not include indirect economic effects from loss of life, business interruption,
and loss of production (Copper 1995, Kobe Newspaper 03/04/1999, Japan 21st).
Damage was recorded over a 100-kilometer radius from the epicenter, including
the cities of Kobe, Osaka, and Kyoto, but Kobe and its immediate region were the areas
most severely affected. Damage was particularly severe in central Kobe, in an area
roughly 5 kilometers by 20 kilometers parallel to the Port of Kobe. This coastal area is
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composed primarily of soft alluvial soils and artificial fills. Severe damage extended well
northeast and east of Kobe into the outskirts of Osaka and its port (Copper 1995,
Hakeda).
Japan began to implement anti-earthquake measures in the wake of the Great
Kanto Earthquake of 1923 (Fluchter 2002), but by about 1935 the important lessons from
that disaster had began to be forgotten because of the war in Asia.

Postwar

reconstruction went forward without much thought being given to disaster prevention.
The question today is whether government policy emphasized earthquake mitigation
planning in the recovery from the Hanshin Awaji earthquake.

The purpose of this

research is to investigate effective planning techniques for seismic risk, using Kobe,
Japan as a case study.

2

Chapter II
Review of Literature
Study Area: Kobe, Hyogo Prefecture, Japan
In 1868, a port was opened to international trade and the modern city of Kobe
was created. It grew in size and importance as an international port and industrial
center during the early twentieth century. By 1939 the population had reached one
million. During World War II, Kobe sustained enormous damage, with large parts of the
city devastated. The population fell to less than four hundred thousand.

After the war,

Kobe rebuilt quickly and grew steadily to its November 1994 population of slightly over
1.5 million (Icon Group International 1997, Tanaka 1997).
Osaka, Kyoto and Kobe form the Kansai Metropolis, Japan’s second largest
metropolitan area. Located on Osaka Bay, the urbanized portion of Kobe stretches
about 30 kilometers along the waterfront with a width of about 2 to 4 kilometers, about
80% of the population live in this part of the city. In the Rokko Mountains surrounding the
traditional urban development, and still within the city boundaries, Kobe has developed a
number of new towns with high-density housing, industry, and universities. They are
linked to the city center by train and subway.

Most of the population growth of the last

thirty years has been accommodated in these new towns, rather than in the traditional
urban area, or in U.S. style sprawl.

The contrasts between the city center and the new

communities, between the bay area and the mountains, visible from the heart of the city
give Kobe a distinct character(Icon Group International 1997, Tanaka 1997).
The port of Kobe, the largest in Japan, is a major factor in the city’s culture and the
region’s economy.

Like other large first world cities, Kobe has been experiencing

decline in heavy industry and greater dependence on office, service sector, and retail
3

employment.

Before the earthquake, almost a third of the city’s approximately 770,000

jobs were in wholesale and retail trade, over 25% in services, and 10% in transportation
and communications(Icon Group International 1997, Tanaka 1997).
Kobe’s port-based history gives it an international flavor for a Japanese city.
About 3% of the population are foreign-born or of foreign extraction, a high proportion for
Japan. Tourism is one of Kobe’s signature industries, Japanese tourists are attracted by
the Victorian-style mansions built by European and American merchants in the Kitano
District, modern retail districts on the waterfront with international restaurants and
boutiques.

In 1994, the year before the earthquake, Kobe had about 24.4 million visitors,

a number 11% lower than 1993, which had been a very good year for tourism (Icon Group
International 1997, Hakeda, Nakase 2000).
Kobe’s central city neighborhoods are well-defined communities, usually grouped
around a shopping street with strong traditional institutions.

Some, particularly on the

less prosperous and prestigious west side of Kobe, are experiencing a change in the age
of the population as industries decline and the younger, more mobile population seek
opportunities elsewhere. Still, many residents feel a strong identification with and loyalty
to their neighborhood.

East side neighborhoods are generally higher income, with many

residents commuting into Osaka (Icon Group International 1997, Hakeda, Nakase 2000).
Before the earthquake, there were about 540,000 residential units in Kobe, most
built since the war. Both old and new housing is dense by U.S. standards, citywide
density is about 2,500-persons/square kilometer.

Nagata Ward, on the city’s west side,

is the densest of Kobe’s nine wards, with 11,000-persons/square kilometer in 1993.
Some of these older residential neighborhoods still have before war land patterns, very
small lots with wooden houses served by every narrow lanes which are sometimes
4

easements over a neighbor’s property rather than part of the public road network.

New

high-density residential construction in the city center, as well as the new developments
outside of the traditional center, is usually reinforced concrete or steel frame.

However,

in the early 1990s there were still over 250,000 wooden residences (Icon Group
International 1997, www.city.kobe.jp ).
Seismic Risk
An earthquake occurs when rocks break and slip along a fault in the earth.
Energy is released during an earthquake in several forms, including as movement along
the fault, as heat, and as seismic waves that radiate out from the "source" and causes the
ground to shake, sometimes hundreds of kilometer's away (Copper 1995).
Earthquakes occur all over the world; however, most occur on active faults that
define the major tectonic plates of the earth. Ninety percent of the world's earthquakes
occur along these plate boundaries (that represent about 10% of the surface of the earth)
(Icon National International 1997, Wisner 1998).

Due to the heating and cooling of the

rock below these plates, the resulting convection causes the adjacent overlying plates to
move, and, under great stresses, deform. The rates of plate movements range from
about 2 to 12 centimeters per year. Sometimes, tremendous energy can build up within a
single, or between neighboring plates. If the accumulated stress exceeds the strength of
the rocks making up these brittle zones, the rocks can break suddenly, releasing the
stored energy as an earthquake (www.yomiuri.co.jp 05/05/1996, Icon National
International 1997).
Most earthquake damage is caused by ground shaking. The magnitude or size of
an earthquake, distance to the earthquake focus or source, type of faulting, depth, and

5

type of material are important factors in determining the amount of ground shaking that
might be produced at a particular site. Where there is an extensive history of earthquake
activity, these parameters can often be estimated. The magnitude of an earthquake, for
instance, influences ground shaking in several ways. Large earthquakes usually produce
ground motions with large amplitudes and long durations. Large earthquakes also
produce strong shaking over much larger areas than do smaller earthquakes. In addition,
the amplitude of ground motion decreases with increasing distance from the focus of an
earthquake. The frequency content of the shaking also changes with distance. Close to
the epicenter, both high (rapid) and low (slow)-frequency motions are present. Farther
away, low-frequency motions are dominant, a natural consequence of wave attenuation
in rock. The frequency of ground motion is an important factor in determining the severity
of damage to structures and which structures are affected (Masuda 1997)
Japan, in general, is earthquake country, and the Kansai Region (Kobe, Osaka,
Kyoto) has a long history of major earthquakes, although the largest event in the 20th
century (before the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake) within the immediate vicinity of Kobe was
magnitude 6.1 in 1916 (Figure 1). Southwestern Japan (Kansai Region) is located on the
southeastern margin of the Eurasian Plate, where the Philippine Sea Plate is being thrust
(subducted) beneath the Eurasian Plate in a northwest direction along the Nankai Trough
(Figure 2). A portion of this relative plate motion is taken up by right-lateral strike-slip
faulting along a major east-northeast-trending fault known as the Median Tectonic Line,
located immediately south of Awaji Island and Osaka Bay. (Masuda 1997).
Kobe is located farther than many other cities in Japan from the dangerous
intersection of three tectonic plates: the Eurasian, Philippine, and North American. This
triple junction is a intersection of three compressive subduction zones. Kobe is also
6

somewhat off the Median Tectonic Line, a zone of strike-slip faults that follows the plate
boundaries (Yomiuri news paper Jan 20, 1995).
Figure 1*: Map - Destructive Earthquakes Occurring in Japan in the 20th century†

3. Urakawa Earthquake (03/21/1982 M7.1)
4. Nihonkai-Chubu Earthquake (05/26/1983 M7.7)
5. Oga-Hanto Earthquake (05/01/1939)
6. Niigata Earthquake (06/16/1964 M7.5)

*
†

Source: Kobe News Paper Sep 15 2001
Earthquake 1 and 2 are located outside of this image
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7. Nishi-Saitama Earthquake (09/14/1984 M6.9)
8. Nagano-ken Seibu Earthquake (09/14/1984 M6.8)
9. Fukui Earthquake (06/28/1948 M7.1)
10. Kita-Tango Earthquake (03/07/1927 M6.8)
11. Kita-Tajima Earthquake (05/23/1925 M6.8)
12. Tottori Earthquake (10/06/2000 M7.3)
13. Hanshin Awaji Earthquake (01/17/1995 M7.2)
14. Ebino Earthquake (02/21/1968)
15. Kikai-Shima Earthquake (09/15/1973 M6.8)
16. Hyuga-nada Earthquake (04/01/1968 M7.8)
17. Nankai-Mie Earthquake (12/07/1944 M7.9)
18. Yoshino Earthquake (07/18/1952 M6.8)
19. Tonankai Earthquake (06/04/1945 M8.0)
20. Mikawa Earthquake (01/13/1945 M7.1)
21. Kita-Izu Earthquake (11/26/1930 M7.0)
22. Kanto Earthquake (09/01/1923/M7.9)
23. Boso-Oki Earthquake (11/26/1953 M7.4)
24. Fukushima-Oki Earthquake (earthquakes (M7.0-7.5) occur frequently here) (1987)
25. Sanriku-Oki Earthquake (12/28/1994 M7.5)
26. Tokachi-Oki (1968) Earthquake (05/16/1968)
27. Tokachi-Oki (1952) Earthquake (03/04/1952)
28. Kushiro-oki Earthquake (01/08/1993 M7.8)
29. Hokkaido Toho-Oki Earthquake (10/04/1994 M8.1)

8

Figure 2: Map-Around Japan‡

The main shock of the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake occurred along a
northwest-trending branch of the Median Tectonic Line called the Arima-Takatsuki
Tectonic Line. This region has seen somewhat lesser seismicity than in the Tokyo area
and some other parts of Japan, but has had magnitude 7 or greater events in historical
times (e.g., in 1596). In 1916, a magnitude 6.1 earthquake occurred at almost the same
epicentral location as the 1995 event.

(Kunami 1999, www.yomiuri.co.jp 3/11/1995,

Zhang 1999)
In the Kobe area, crust material is composed of cretaceous granites overlain by a
relatively thick sedimentary deposits called the Osaka group, which consists of alluvium
interbedded with marine clays (Pavlenko 2002). Relatively thin terrace deposits and
recent alluvium overlie the Osaka group. Fill material has been placed along much of the
waterfront and comprises the human-made islands, such as Port and Rokko islands
(Menomi 2001, www.yomiuri.co.jp 2/15/1996). The earthquake caused extensive ground

‡

Source: www.yomiuri.co.jp(05/14/1996)
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failures, which affected buildings, underground infrastructure, the port, highways, all
types of other facilities on soft or filled ground (Kunami 1999, Icon group International
1997).
Urban Planning Japan
Since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan has transformed from a feudal
agrarian society into one that is focused on the city. The rapid building of cities occurred
in a context that values cities and the investment that they represent. Since World War II,
impressive economic growth has accompanied large-scale urbanization without the large
scale abandonment of the inner city that has occurred in some American urban areas
(Evans 2002, Fluchther 2003, Palm 1998).
The Japanese Government’s role in the development and building of cities has
often emphasized the creation of up to date infrastructure that reinforces the role of the
city center. Transportation defines the shape of the urban area, with higher density areas
usually closely linked to railroads and subways. Some planners, activists, and citizens
criticize this approach today, decrying the lack of attention to design and social factors in
Japanese city planning (Evans 2002, Flechther 2003, Todokoro 1996).
Throughout history there have been many occasions when Japanese cities had
to rebuild quickly after disasters, such as fires, earthquakes, floods, and wars.
Preparing for, and recovering from, disasters have been an explicit topic in city planning.
Indeed some of the common programs and tools in Japanese planning have evolved in
response to the country’s experience with rebuilding cities after disasters. This repeated
experience of rebuilding has also reinforced a cultural belief that land, not buildings,
represents the primary value of real estate. Japanese planning and development
practices reflect this strong tie to land rather than buildings (Flechther 2003, Todokoro
10

1996).
The central government continues to play a major role in determining urban
policies and programs. Since the national Comprehensive Development Law of 1950, the
central government has created National Comprehensive Plans to guide development at
the national level and to set national land use policies. Local governments prepare
master plans, working within national guidelines of the Ministry of Home Affairs. These
plans cover a broader range of issues than the typical U.S. plans, including social
services and economic development as well as physical planning, and are updated on a
ten-year-cycle. Kobe City was in the final stages of preparing a new master plan when the
earthquake struck (Flechther 2003, Todokoro 1996).
The Urban Planning Act of 1968, administered by the Ministry of Construction, is
the framework for land use planning and zoning in urban areas. The prefecture
government defines the urban planning zones within which the Act applies. Cities with a
population of over one million, including Kobe, have special status and are able to
operate more independently of the prefecture. The urban planning zones are divided into
Urban Promotion Areas and Urbanization Control Areas. Development within
Urbanization Control Areas is discouraged within the time period of the plan.
In the Urbanization Promotion Area public facilities, infrastructure, roads, and
parks are planned for development. Generalized zones are designated, using twelve
zoning classifications that regulate use, height, floor area ratio, and other features.
Specific areas where the local government intends to carry out defined planning projects
to change or intensify development are identified, as are areas where neighborhood
planning will take place.
Other national legislation that determines how city planning is carried out is the
11

Building Standards Act. In addition to regulation construction, it sets standards that in the
U.S. might be part of planning or zoning codes, such as setbacks based on the street
width. These building and lot regulations are primarily directed at mitigating fire hazards
(Evans 1999, Flechther 2003, Palm 1998, Todokoro 1996).
Kobe’s 1986 Master Plan, the last completed before the 1995 earthquake,
designated 36% of the city as urbanization promotion area and 64% as urbanization
control area. It contained a series of very general land use policy goals, and more specific
consideration of the transportation network and recommended improvements.

It

reflected the philosophy that much of the city’s population and economic growth should
occur at identified areas away from the traditional city center and should be linked by
public transportation. Within the existing urbanized area, the Plan shows an ongoing
history of land readjustment and urban redevelopment projects to “improve not only
public facilities and roads, but also living and business environments” (www.city.kobe.jp).
One of the goals identified in the Plan was to implement “preventive measures against
disaster” (Fluchter 2003, www.city.kobe.jp, web.pref.hyogo.jp) .
Kobe City’s pre-earthquake planning and economic development efforts focused
on the service sector and capitalized on Kobe’s international ties and image. Economic
development efforts included fostering the tourist and fashion industries, and
encouraging information-based activities such as multimedia and health research as
strategies to ease the transition from an industrial economy to one strong in the service
sectors and more likely to provide economic growth in the future. Local government had
been seeking the establishment of the World Health Organization headquarters in Kobe
and planning for new airport on Port Island. Many of these initiatives were promoted after
the earthquake as recovery tools (Fluchter 2003, www.city.kobe.jp, web.pref.hyogo.jp).
12

The land use conditions articulated in the 1986 Kobe Master Plan explain some
of the patterns of damage during the 1995 earthquake. The new development during the
rapid growth of the past three decades, was built to higher engineering standards and
escaped the level of devastation experienced by some older neighborhoods. The worst
hit parts of the city in 1995 earthquake had a very different development history. Some
sections had escaped destruction in World War II, had avoided or resisted the city’s
advancement of land readjustment over the years, and had not experienced much new
privately financed construction (Fluchter 2003, Hiyarama 2000, www.city.kobe.jp,
web.pref.hyogo.jp).
Japanese planning faces some challenges that are not so common in the U.S.
One is the small scale of traditional Japanese neighborhoods. A desire to maintain
ownership have resulted in remarkably small land holdings, in complex layouts, with
access sometimes off of alleys across another’s land. Yards and setbacks are difficult or
impossible to provide and access by car or emergency vehicle can be limited. Another
challenge is the complexity of landownership. Land and the buildings that occupy it can
have different owners. Tenants often hold substantial rights to their spaces. When tenants
with rights occupy buildings, there can be several parties with a stake in the property,
complicating the decision making process and making changes difficult (Flechther 2003,
Todokoro 1996).
Japanese use of infrastructure as a way of shaping the form of cities within the
urbanization control areas probably does so more than any other form of city planning,
construction, or regulation. But within the cities, land use planning tools, largely controlled
locally, can shape districts and influence the appearance and function of neighborhoods
(Evans 1999, Flechther 2003, Todokoro 1996).
13

Many of these methods, from large-scale urban redevelopment to the very local
joint building projects, involve ceding, joining, trading, or acquiring various kinds of
property rights. Calculating and negotiating the land, property rights, and money
contributions of the various participants is complex and sometimes difficult. Explaining,
brokering, and working out these negotiations is a large part of the responsibility of the
planners working on these projects. After the earthquake, this was one of Japan’s biggest
challenges (Flechther 2003, Todokoro 1996).
Land readjustment is a planning method of changing property boundaries to
allow community improvements, such as wider streets and more open place. Since the
nineteenth century, land readjustment has helped to expedite the conversion of
agricultural land to urban use. It was used during reconstruction after the Great Kanto
Earthquake of 1923, and during rebuilding following World War II. During 1960s, it was
used to create new towns. More recently land readjustment has been used as a way to
revitalize and reshape city neighborhoods that do not meet current standards of public
service and amenity, where roads are inadequate and small lot sizes and inadequate
street access make building in compliance with regulations difficult or impossible. It can
provide opportunities to create higher density housing and to provide necessary
infrastructure and public services.
Government agencies, individuals, or cooperatives can initiate land readjustment
projects (Flechther 2003, Todokoro 1996, www.city.kobe.jp ). The central government
encourages land readjustment for planning and recovery by subsidizing the roads and
infrastructure

that

result

(Evans

2002,

Flechther

2003,

Todokoro

1996,

www.city.kobe.jp ).
Land readjustment involves the pooling of private land and redesigning the
14

spatial pattern of land use with adequate space allowed for roads, infrastructure, and
open space. Because some of the pooled land is now devoted to public uses, the new
lots are smaller than the old ones, by consistent percentage. But because the property
has gained better access, services, and amenities, their value has increased by a similar
amount.
Many of the older portions of Kobe have been through the land readjustment
process. Projects totaling over 5,000 ha were identified in the 1989 version of Master
Plan. The primary goal of these projects was to reduce fire risks by rebuilding crowded
wooden buildings, widening roads, and providing open space. Planning consultants
supplied by the city were usually very involved, serving as designers, technical advisors,
and community organizers. They eased communication between the city and the
residents, who were sometimes distrustful (Menoni 2001). In some cases, the
readjustment process was lengthy, taking as many as fifteen years to complete. There
were many discussions between the city and the residents regarding the various plans
that were developed (www.city.kobe.jp, http://web.pref.hyogo.jp).
Government subsidies are available to assist in the preparation and
implementation of land readjustment projects. Since World War II, 30% of the land in
Japanese central cities has been subject to land readjustment. There is considerable
controversy among land use professionals and academics about the strengths and
weaknesses of the land readjustment process.

Especially in areas with small lots,

property owners sometimes view it as confiscatory, and focus on the percentage of land
they will lose. Nonetheless, it remains an available and common way for cities to plan and
build public infrastructure, and to influence landownership patterns (Flechther 2003,
Hirayama 2000, Tokorodo 1996).
15

Larger scale planning occurs where more substantial land use changes, density
increases, and infrastructure improvements are sought, often around urban train stations.
Public agencies or private development organizations can acquire property, or property
owner’s interest can be converted from land to building space in the new development.
The usual goal of urban redevelopment is to increase land use density and take
advantage of investments in infrastructure. It can be carried out by a private or public
corporation, and involves substantial involvement of the property owners. Typically, the
owners of the land can convert their property rights into ownership of a portion of the new
building, for example a condominium unit in a new residential building (Flechther 2003,
Todokoro 1996).
District planning allows neighborhoods to create neighborhood specific
regulations such as land use, setback, lot coverage, and floor area ratio. Regulations can
be stricter or less restrictive than the existing zoning, for example imposing height or
design limits while permitting greater lot coverage in an area where small lots are a
problem, or precluding specific uses that are seen as local problems. District planning
also allows discussion of building and landscape design, not usually major issues in land
readjustment (Flechther 2003, Hirayama 2000, Tokotodo 1996).
Other tools are available to owners, and advocated by planners, to provide
flexibility when building on substandard lots, even when there is no area wide planning
effort.

Kyoudouka, a condominium like process, allows owners to pool their lots into

single building site. Each then owns part of the building, in proportion to his or her land
contribution. To encourage this cooperation, the government subsidizes construction of
common areas with multi-unit buildings. Another approach allows owners to build a single
building on their adjacent lots, while maintaining ownership of their land and the part of
16

the building that occupies it. Either of these methods of cooperative design and
construction can help the owners share costs, simplify construction, develop substandard
lots, and improve access and appearance (Hirayama 2000).
Like many large cities in Japan and elsewhere, housing in Kobe was tight prior to
the 1995 earthquake, with low vacancy rates and high prices. While maintaining a strong
cultural bias towards private homeownership, the Japanese government, as well as other
institutions, had responded to fill gaps in the housing market. National, prefecture and
local governments, and quasi-government corporations, constructed, owned, and
operated a large amount of housing. Rent, while below that available in the private
housing market, did not seem to be considered a subsidy for the very poor, or a safety net
for the destitute. Public and semi public agencies, including the city, the prefecture, and
national Housing and Urban Development agency, operated about 73,000 units in Kobe
before the earthquake. Private companies, which often provide housing to attract and
keep employees, operated about 22,000 Kobe units. Because of their experience and
importance in providing housing, government housing agencies have considerable
expertise, experience, and resources to undertake large scale housing construction
(Lekkas 2002, www.city.kobe.jp, web.pref.hyogo.jp).
Attitudes toward landownership and homeownership also differ between Japan
and the U.S. For many in Japan, land is viewed less as a commodity than in the U.S. and
more as representing one’s family heritage. It is often held for long periods of time, rather
than being bought and sold as the market and the owner’s needs change. While an
American family with a house that does not meet its current needs will often sell it and
buy another, a Japanese family will demolish and rebuild in the same location. As a result,
people are not always willing or able to move freely, especially those without financial
17

resources (Fluchter 2003, Palm 1998).
The City of Kobe has reputation for entrepreneurial city planning. Its independent
approach is both praised and criticized in Kobe and elsewhere in Japan. This
independence had strained the relationship between the local and central governments.
The most dramatic city development projects are the creation of two large manmade
islands, Port Island and Rokko Island, off Kobe’s central waterfront. These islands, at 830
ha and 580 ha, contain port facilities on their perimeters, commercial, convention, and
industrial facilities, and residences and supporting services intended to house fifty
thousand residents. They are connected to downtown Kobe with monorails (Menoni
2001).
The islands were created using cleared material from the hills inland from the city,
where new town development occurred. The islands (also new town sites) are linked to
the city center with subways and have a planned population of 185,000 (Lekkas 2002).
This entrepreneurial approach and development of new towns has resulted in substantial
income to the city, especially during the years when Japanese land prices were
increasing Menori 2001).
Hanshin Awaji Earthquake
At 5:46 am on January 17, 1995, the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the first
major quake to directly hit a Japanese urban area, inflicted unprecedented heavy
damage in the Hanshin-Awaji region, i.e on the cities of Kobe, Awaji, Ashiya and
Nishinomiya and their surrounding areas (Figure 3, Table 1). The powerful jolt, which
lasted barely 20 seconds, took 4,569 lives in Kobe City alone, practically reducing the
elegant harbor city developed through many centuries of hard work, to mere piles of
debris and depriving many people of the very basis of their livelihood. The death toll of
18

the earthquake totaled about 6300 and about 35,000 people were injured. Fifty eight
percent of those who died were 60 years old or older. Many people died from being
crushed by collapsed houses,

seventy three percent died from suffocation or being

crushed. (Icon Group International 1997, www.city.kobe.jp)
Figure 3: Areas of Kobe Wards Experiencing Magnitude 7 Shaking§

§

Source: www.city.kobe.co.jp
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Table 1: Earthquake Victims by Kobe City Wards**

Higashi Nada
Dead

Nada

Chuo Hyogo Nagata Suma Tarumi Nishi Kita

Total

1,471

933

244

555

919

401

25

11

12

4,571

120

74

90

96

79

69

41

16

29

599

-Shelters
Evacuees
-Overnight

60,700 35,000 35,172 26,300 35,347 21,067

6,926 1,777 2,348 222,127

-Daytime

65,859 40,394 39,090 26,300 55,641 21,728

4,747 1,787 2,360 236,899

(Peak)

Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake took thousands of lives including later
earthquake-attributed deaths due to sickness, difficult living conditions, etc. after the
earthquake. Many roads, including highways, were damaged and traffic disrupted. The
Hanshin Expressway Kobe Route 43 and Route 23 were restricted during this
expressway reconstruction period. Since both roads are major trunk roads linking Osaka
and Kobe, car traffic between Osaka and Kobe remained congested until their
reconstruction (Chang 2003, Hirayama 1999).
The number of buildings destroyed by the earthquake exceeded 100,000 across
the Kansai region. An additional 80,000 buildings were badly damaged. The large
numbers of damaged traditional-style Japanese residences and small, traditional
commercial buildings of three stories or less accounted for a great deal of the destruction.
In sections in the central

Kobe, where these buildings were concentrated, entire blocks

of collapsed buildings were common. Several thousand buildings were also destroyed by

**

Revised figures as of January 11,2000, Source: www.city.kobe.jp

20

the fires following the earthquake (Chang 2003, Hirayama 1999, Lekkas 2000, Palm
1998).
Many Japanese municipalities, and particularly Tokyo, have long considered
earthquake-generated fires to be very high risks, and various risk management programs
have been started in Japan. Kobe, for example, had specially constructed underground
cisterns for fighting fires if parts or all of the distribution water lines failed. However,
whatever measures had been taken in Kobe were overwhelmed following the Hanshin
Awaji Earthquake (Lekkas 2000).
The Kobe Fire Department (KFD) had minimal staffing on duty at the time of the
earthquake, possibly because the previous day had been a holiday. Initial actions
included recalling off-duty personnel and responding to fire calls. Approximately 100 fires
broke out within minutes, primarily in the densely built-up, low-rise areas of the central
city, which comprise mixed residential-commercial occupancies, predominantly of wood
construction. Within 1 to 2 hours, several large conflagrations had developed. There were
a total of 142 fires reported in Kobe on January 17, the majority being in the wards of
Higashi Nada (24), Nada (24), Hyogo (37), Nagata (19), and Suma (18). The fire
response was hampered by extreme traffic congestion, and collapsed houses, buildings,
and rubble in the streets (Figure 4).

Because of numerous building and road collapses,

many areas were inaccessible to vehicles (Lekkas 2000).
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Figure 4. Burnout Area by Kobe Ward††
B urnout area (m *m )
600000
500000
400000
300000

B urnout area (m *m )

200000
100000

Ta

Ni
s

hi
k
ru u
mi
k
Su u
ma
k
Na u
ga
ta
ku
Hy
oo
go
Cy ku
uu
oo
ku
N
a
Hi
ga dak
u
sh
in
ad
ak
Ki u
ta
ku

0

Damage to structures due to shaking affected tens of thousands of commercial
and residential buildings in the Kobe area. Mid-rise commercial buildings, generally 6 to
12 stories high, make up a substantial portion of the buildings in the Kobe business
district. The highest concentration of damaged mid-rise buildings was observed in the
Sannomiya area of Kobe's central business district (Nagata Ward). In this area, most of
the commercial buildings had some structural damage, and a large number of buildings
collapsed on virtually every block. Failures of major commercial and residential buildings

††

Souce: www.city.kobe.jp
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were noted as far away as Ashiya, Nishinomiya, and Takarazuka districts. Newer
structures performed quite well and withstood the earthquake with little or no damage
(Lekkas 2000, Palm 1998, Yamada 1999).
In the heavily damaged central sections of downtown Kobe, approximately 60% of
the buildings had significant structural damage, and about 20% completely or partially
collapsed. One survey of a 120,000-square-meter area in downtown Kobe (the
Sannomiya area) found that 21 out of 116 buildings, or 18%, were visibly destroyed.
Another report indicated that 22% of office buildings in a portion of the Kobe city center
were unusable, while an additional 66% may need more than six months for complete
restoration. City inspectors declared approximately 50% of the multifamily dwellings in
Kobe as unsafe to enter or unfit for habitation, leaving more than 300,000 people
homeless (Figure 5) (Lekkas 2000, Palm 1998).
Age of construction, soil and foundation condition, proximity to the fault, and type
of construction were major determining factors in the performance of structures. Damage
was worst in the areas bordering the port or streams and rivers where soils were either
poorly consolidated alluvial deposits or fill. Loose and soft soils amplify ground motions in
comparison to bedrock, especially ground motions within a certain frequency range. The
duration of shaking also tends to be longer on such soils. Consequently, damage tended
to be relatively minor in the foothills of Rokko Mountain, where either soils are very
shallow or there are rock outcroppings rock (Lekkas 2000, Palm 1998, Pavlenko 2002).
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Figure 5: Loss of Housing Units‡‡
Units lost
#

Remaining Units
%

#

Total

%

#

%

Kobe City

79283

15.1

445450

84.9

524733

100

Severely Damaged Urban

74234

23.7

238851

76.3

313085

100

Higashi-nada

16174

24.9

48845

75.1

65019

100

Nada

10050

23.2

33280

76.8

43330

100

Chuo

5964

13.5

38271

86.5

44235

100

Hyogo

7984

20.9

30237

79.1

38221

100

Nagata

23301

39.2

36186

60.8

59487

100

Suma

10761

17.1

52032

82.9

62793

100

5049

2.4

206599

97.6

211648

100

Tarumi

3094

3.6

81847

96.4

84941

100

Kita

922

1.5

61002

98.5

61924

100

Nishi

1033

1.6

63750

98.4

64783

100

Single family houses

27738

27.0

75006

73.0

102744

100

Wooden terraced houses

17475

55.6

13969

44.4

31444

100

Wooden multi-family houses

11223

44.6

13948

55.4

25171

100

Houses with commercial and

10298

30.7

23254

69.3

33552

100

5873

5.3

105256

94.7

111129

100

1627

18.0

7418

82.0

9045

100

Before1945

20196

58.3

14426

41.7

34622

100

1946-1955

9176

48.7

9652

51.3

18823

100

1956-1965

20416

48.7

21511

51.3

41927

100

1966-1975

15665

22.9

52715

77.1

68380

100

1976-1985

4520

6.1

69570

93.9

74090

100

1986-

4261

5.7

70977

94.3

75238

100

Wards

Suburban Wards

Housing Type

other area
Non-wooden multi family
houses
Other houses
Year of Construction

‡‡

Source: www.city.kobe.jp
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Damage to infrastructure was severe, in addition to the highways already
mentioned, railways, power, water, and communications were disrupted for months after
the earthquake. Twenty-eight railway lines (a total 389 kilometers) in the region, including
three main railways linking Kobe and Osaka, were disrupted severely and restored
gradually over a period of 218 days (Chang 2002, Hakeda, Koshiyama 2003, Lekkas
2000, Palm 1998).
Power failure affected over two million households; city gas services were stopped
for approximately 850,000 households. Water services were disrupted at over one million
households. And over 280,000 telephone lines were disconnected. These utilities were
also restored gradually. Electricity was restored in about a week, telephone lines in a
couple of weeks, city gas services by April 11, and water services by April 17th, 1995
(Lekkas 2000, Hirayama 2000, Palm 1998).
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Chapter III
Methodology
Research Design
The purpose of this research is to investigate the application of effective planning
techniques in response to seismic risk, using Kobe, Japan as a case study. The research
is motivated by concern over earthquake damage and loss of life. The application of
mitigation measures may prevent some of the devastating effects of future earthquakes
and improve planning overall.
A qualitative approach is taken for this investigation, because by using a
qualitative approach, one can focus on actual phenomena (i.e. human response to an
earthquake) occurring in natural settings. Through this study, the nature of the
earthquake, its setting, processes, effects on people and city structure can be revealed.
And, the effectiveness of city planning in the recovery period can be evaluated.
A case study is chosen as the research method. By using this method, the
recovery from the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake is studied in depth. It is hoped that detailing
the cultural context could promote understanding or inform upon similar situations of
disaster recovery in Japan and other developed countries.
Qualitative data is collected from a variety of sources: interviews, the internet,
and library materials. Books, journals, magazines, and newspapers in Japanese and
English provide important information on the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake and its aftermath.
For example, 1995-2004 editions of the Yomiuri Shinbun (major national newspaper) and
Kobe Shinbun (local newspaper) provided valuable information.
Additional information was obtained from interviews conducted with public
officials including Mr. Yosuke Ikenaga (Kobe City Planning Bureau), Mr. Takashi
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Yamashita (Urban Planning Bureau, Hyogo Prefecture), and Professor Masaya
Kobayashi (Kobe University). The interviews required travel to Japan, however, additional
information was obtained through communication by e-mail, and phone calls from
Huntington to Japan.
The following questions were posed in semi-structured interviews:
1. What city planning was implemented for preventing earthquake damage both before
and after the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake?
a. Mitigation measures
b. Emergency infrastructure
c. Building regulations
d. Population density
2. What have you learned from this disaster?
The Interviewees
Mr. Ikenaga, Mr. Yamashita
The two officials were interviewed together on December 24, 2003 in Kobe City
Hall. Mr. Ikenaga has been working for Kobe City Bureau since 1986.

Mr. Yamashita

has been working for Hyogo Prefecture since 1981. Because of their close working
association and friendship, their interview occurred together.
They discussed a lot of emergency issues and responses revealed in the results
section. Right now, they are involved in the program design of improved disaster
preparation management for Kobe City. There are seven items for concern: 1)
strengthening information gathering, processing and distribution capabilities, 2)
strengthening rescue and emergency medical systems, 3) strengthening fire fighting
capability, 4) establishing a system for supplying food and emergency supplies, 5)
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procurement of sufficient supply of drinking water, 6) maintenance of emergency toilet
facilities, and, 7) creation of a secure living environment. Possible means to achieve
their goals include creating a comprehensive disaster preventive communications
network, installation of large capacity water pipes, the construction of anti-seismic water
storage tanks, and the establishment of emergency hotlines to help local people in the
event of another disaster. The current plans discussed by Mr. Ikenaga and Mr. Yamashita
are still in the planning stage almost 10 years after the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake.
Professor Kobayashi
Professor Kobayashi was interviewed on December 26, 2003 at his office in Kobe
University. He is a professor of Kobe University, teaching urban planning.
He provided much information about temporary housing created after the Hanshin
Awaji Earthquake. A lot of temporary housing was built for people who lost their houses,
located in parks or school yards. Detailed information on the temporary housing are
written later in the results section.
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Chapter IV
Results
Kobe City Recovery Plan
Many of the planning processes, skills and information available to the people of
Kobe after the earthquake existed before the earthquake. It was necessary to use the
tools at hand. The problems that were post-disaster problems merged into the
pre-disaster problems creating a blur of regular planning and post-disaster planning
processes. Post-earthquake city planning in Kobe is another stage in the city’s physical
development that is growing out of what went before, influenced by economic, political,
social, and physical development trends and ideas in Kobe and throughout Japan (Berke
1992, www.city.kobe.jp).
Post-earthquake planning occurred in a general framework established by a
committee including officials of the central government, the prefecture governor, and the
mayors. These guidelines set a tone for later efforts. Amid general statements about the
need to rebuild homes and economies was a recognition that older people were
disproportionately affected and that ongoing economic trends needed to be considered in
the recovery. The guidelines make explicit the special responsibility felt by the central
government for the repair of the transportation infrastructure. They also call out the
importance of incorporating disaster resistance into rebuilding and recovery. The central
government committed to the funding and necessary legislation to facilitate Kobe’s
recovery from the earthquake. Nonetheless, differences emerged about the line between
rebuilding and improving public facilities.

Some felt that the government, with its

national responsibilities, sometimes favored the needs of other areas over funding
recovery projects in the Kansai Region. In Japan, the national government sometimes
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argues that its funding responsibilities end with repair and replacement, not extending to
improvement. Local agencies incorporate ongoing local goals into the recovery plans
(Ikenaga 2003, www.city.kobe.jp, http://web.pref.hyogo.jp www.yomiuri.co.jp ).
At the time of the earthquake, the City of Kobe had nearly completed the ten-year
update of its Master Plan. Afterwards, its energy was, of course, diverted to the
preparation of the Recovery Plan, which built on the earlier draft Master Plan. The
Master Plan was updated to reflect the developments included in the Recovery Plan and
completed in October 1995 (Ikenaga 2003, www.city.kobe.jp, http://web.pref.hyogo.jp
www.yomiuri.co.jp )
Post-earthquake plans produced by Kobe City incorporated disaster mitigation
and preparedness concepts in very general terms. In addition to a new emphasis on
housing, many of the pre-earthquake economic development ideas were carried over
from pre-quake plans. Tourism, fashion, high technology, and international trade were still
seen as the promising future efforts. Symbolic projects were proposed, e.g. high-profile
projects that would lead the recovery. They include a health science center featuring the
World Health Organization (WHO) headquarters, Kobe International Multimedia and
Entertainment City, SATY, and an enterprise zone.
Some elements of the plan are controversial. A proposed airport on Port Island
has long been controversial locally, but it was incorporated into the Recovery Plan and
construction will begin soon. The airport and the enterprise zone were not accepted by
the central government as fundable recovery efforts (Ikenaga 2003, Yamashita 2003,
www.city.kobe.jp, http://web.pref.hyogo.jp www.yomiuri.co.jp ).
Public assistance, largely in the form of consultant services, was available to fund
neighborhood plans in any neighborhood that requested it. National money was made
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available by the central government for infrastructure repair and other public
improvements. As before the earthquake, planning consultants provided technical
assistance and design advice, advocated cooperative planning and rebuilding, and
served as liaison between residents and city government. Their work was especially
critical after the earthquake when city resources were stretched thin. Private planners,
architects, and others formed a system to coordinate and support neighborhood
planning efforts, and to raise money for neighborhood projects (Ikenaga 2003, Kobayashi
2003 www.city.kobe.jp, http://web.pref.hyogo.jp, www.yomiuri.co.jp).
Within six weeks of the earthquake, thirteen areas were identified where
reexamination of land use patterns would occur, including the application of urban
redevelopment and land readjustment. These city planning area designations were made
in consultation with the central government. New plans would include changes in the
street network, upgraded infrastructure, changes in density, and new ownership patterns.
In addition to the degree of damage, these designations reflected the city’s ideas about
the future form of Kobe (Ikenaga 2003, www.city.kobe.jp, http://web.pref.hyogo.jp,
www.yomiuri.co.jp ).
The earthquake illustrated that the Kobe housing situation had two distinct sides.
Those with resources were able, to various degrees, to reconstruct their homes or find
suitable housing. But another large segment of the population could not function in the
housing market, many of which resided in public housing prior to the earthquake. Without
the cheap housing that was destroyed, they could not be housed. Housing provided by
the private market did not supply the needs of those outside of the market (Kobayashi,
2003, Ikenaga 2003, www.city.kobe.jp, http://web.pref.hyogo.jp, www.yomiuri.co.jp ).
Not surprisingly, considering the very mixed nature of the Japanese housing
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system (private versus public), there were conflicting attitudes about the responsibility for
post-earthquake housing. There is no large-scale central government program for
subsidizing the rebuilding of privately owned housing. Some say that providing housing
assistance to private homeowners is not the responsibility of government or the
taxpayers. At the same time, because the central government is a large provider of
housing in Japan, its responsibility for providing for those left out of the housing market
after the earthquake was assumed (Kobayashi 2003, Ikenaga 2003, www.city.kobe.jp,
http://web.pref.hyogo.jp, www.yomiuri.co.jp ). The central government supported the local
and prefecture governments in providing housing in the recovery period through funding
and advising.
The prefecture government took the lead in coordinating public efforts to provide
public housing. It’s August 1995, Three Year Housing Reconstructing Plan set a goal of
125,00 new units, 80,500 units to be built by public or semi-public agencies including the
Japan Housing and Urban Development Corporation. These agencies had long been
actively involved in providing high-density urban housing, but their involvement was
increased in the prefecture plan (Ikenaga 2003, Yamashita 2003, www.city.kobe.jp,
http://web.pref.hyogo.jp, www.yomiuri.co.jp).
The city’s new public housing received a larger central government subsidy of
eighty percent rather than usual sixty percent. Rent was reduced for those with very low
income. A consolidated application process was created for different public housing
providers and some private owners. In several projects, public agencies contributed to
the rebuilding of multi-unit buildings in exchange for the ownership of units, which could
then

be

administered

as

public

housing

(Ikenaga

2003,

www.city.kobe.jp, http://web.pref.hyogo.jp, www.yomiuri.co.jp).
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Yamashita

2003,

Perhaps as a result of the experience with temporary housing, the plan explicitly
recognizes the nature and the special needs of the new residents of public housing, many
of whom were elderly earthquake victims. It also explores the idea of communal-style
housing for the elderly, with supportive services (Hakeda).
To encourage private landowners to rebuild apartment buildings, Kobe City
created subsidy programs including five-year loans at low interest rates. The rent of
low-income victims of the earthquake were to be subsidized for twenty years (depending
on the status of the victim). Short-term rent subsides were available for low-income
people in private rental housing (Ikenaga 2003, www.city.kobe.jp, http://web.pref.hyogo.jp,
www.yomiuri.co.jp ).
Rebuilding was complicated; cooperation was necessary and economic times
were slow. But private housing reconstruction occurred rapidly after the earthquake.
There were 138,000 housing starts in the prefecture in 1996. And by January 1998,
78,000 units had been completed, considerably higher than the 44,500 planned in the
Prefecture’s Housing Plan. Coupled with a population loss of about 10,000 in the two
years after the earthquake, this resulted in an oversupply of market-rate housing. The
occupancy rate in rental housing reportedly went from ninety-nine percent in early 1995
to sixty one percent at the end of 1996, while rents decreased. Condominium prices,
which had reached a peak in the early 1990s at the height of the bubble economy,
continued

to

fall

after

the

earthquake

(Ikenaga

2003,

www.city.kobe.jp,

http://web.pref.hyogo.jp, www.yomiuri.co.jp).
Temporary Housing
The experience in Kobe required simultaneous planning in the short, medium,
and long-term, while maintaining a vision of the future.
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In the earthquake aftermath,

both planners and residents learned that temporary is a relative term. The pre-disaster
idea that a temporary structure can remain for only two years was quickly discarded.
Public agencies have had to continually adjust to changing circumstances and reexamine
ideas of permanence (Hiyayama 2000).
Some disaster issues had planning implications that were not foreseen. One of
the most immediate post-earthquake problems was debris and trash from damaged and
destroyed buildings. Enormous quantities of debris hindered daily life and the immediate
cleanup. Shortly after the earthquake, the city agreed to pay for debris removal to
encourage swift rebuilding and to improve morale. Planners now believe that the
availability of free debris removal may have encouraged the owners of repairable
buildings to demolish rather than to rebuild. The short-term need to remove debris, and
the way the project was carried out, had unintended long-term consequences (Hirayama
2000, Kobayashi 2003).
Other problems with recovery efforts emerged, including those associated with
temporary housing. National disaster relief law assigns responsibility for providing
temporary housing to the prefectures, with some funding and oversight from the central
government. Hyogo Prefecture had planned to have local governments take over this
responsibility. However, given the unexpected magnitude of the need, a temporary
housing program was created as it was implemented by the prefecture (Hirayama 2000,
Kobayashi 2003).
In the seven months following the earthquake, 48,300 prefabricated temporary
housing units were installed at 634 sites throughout the region by the prefecture
government, largely financed by the central government and managed by city
governments.

About 30,000 units were located in Kobe City. The average cost was
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2,867,000 yen, or roughly $28,700.

Peak occupancy was about 47,000 units in

November 1995 with peak population at about 90,000 (Hirayama 2000, Kobayashi 2003,
6/3/1996 www.kobe-np.co.jp)
Most units were on public land in parks and schoolyards. The largest
concentrations of units were away from the central city (and the areas of greatest
damage) on Port and Rokko Islands and on land to the west and north that was being
prepared for new development (Hirayama 2000, Kobayashi 2003).
Temporary housing (but not utilities) was free to the residents. Before the
earthquake, the Building Standard Law specified that temporary meant up to two years.
The law was revised to allow these units to be used longer when it became clear that
sufficient replacement housing could not be completed sooner (Hirayama 2000,
Kobayashi 2003).
Based on a survey conducted by the Prefecture in October 1995, a
disproportionate number of the people using temporary housing were elderly, with an
average age of over fifty. Almost half were single-person households, and almost half of
the heads of household were over sixty-five. A November 1995 survey of residents
showed that fifty-five percent of temporary housing residents were amongst the poorest
of all families by income. A March 1996 survey of residents found that seventy percent
had low incomes (Hirayama 2000, Kobayashi 2003).
The number of units and the speed with which they were build was impressive.
However, those living in the temporary units had some specific, well-publicized,
grievances. Units were small and inelegant, but the biggest problems experienced by
residents were related to poverty, social conditions, and their relationship to the rest of
the city.

Because of the remoteness of some of the locations, and lack of transit
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accessibility, it was difficult for those with jobs to commute, aggravating the economic
impacts of the earthquake. Shops and community services were unavailable. The most
often heard problem was that a valued sense of community was lost. Important social
networks, which had sometimes even survived in the emergency shelters, were disrupted
(Hirayama 2000, Kobayashi 2003).
The city assigned units using a lottery system. Preference was given to the
elderly and disabled, resulting in large concentrations of elderly. Some felt that the
process of assigning units, which had been intended to assure shelter for those in the
most need, had the opposite effect by breaking up cohesive communities and leaving the
elderly and disabled stranded without the neighbors and institutions on which they
depended. The newspapers carried stories of people who committed suicide or otherwise
died of despair in the far-flung temporary housing compounds. Many thought that entire
neighborhoods should have been assigned together to temporary housing sites
(Hirayama 2000, Kobayashi 2003).
Because of the dissatisfaction with the official temporary housing, unofficial
camps sprung up in city parks and other open spaces. Some camps were tight-knit ethnic
communities whose members were unwilling to leave a familiar neighborhood. Housing
activist groups acted as their advocates (Hirayama 2000, Kobayashi 2003).
As problems in temporary housing emerged, there were efforts to make the
temporary housing better in order to meet people’s needs. Community rooms and public
open spaces were created. Planners, residents and other community volunteers
organized residents to rebuild relationships and improve the quality of life in the
temporary housing complexes. Social services were also provided. Special temporary
housing communities were designed for the elderly with on-site support services and
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more communal space in Ashiya, to the east of Kobe (Hirayama 2000, Kobayashi 2003).
One year after the earthquake, 46,000 units were still occupied. The numbers
declined by over 1,000 a month until the summer of 1996. After that the decline was
slower. As of January 1997, two years after the earthquake, 37,000 households still lived
in temporary housing. As of February 1998, 50 percent of the units were vacant
(Hirayama 2000, Kobayashi 2003, 6/3/1996 www.kobe-np.co.jp). Today all the temporary
housing units have been vacated and removed.
District Planning
Not surprisingly, after the earthquake there were a number of issues that
surfaced in the rebuilding of heavily damaged areas of the inner city and areas in the
periphery. Some of these issues surrounded the future of developments that had been
planned prior to the earthquake, such as the Happy Active Town discussed below. Other
issues arose in the rebuilding of existing neighborhoods or buildings (land readjustment
projects), such as that which occurred in Takatori District also discussed below (Ikenaga,
Yamashita 2003).
After the earthquake, Hyogo Prefecture and Kobe City came together and
implemented a land readjustment policy in nine areas of the inner city where the
earthquake damages were most severe, i.e. damage on more than 80% of their houses
or buildings (Figure 6). Most of the land subject to land readjustment is located in Nagata
ward, Higashinada ward, and Nada ward. Hyogo Prefecture and Kobe City sent
consultants and advisers to community leaders and also sent money to build the new
districts. Figure 7 illustrates one of the new districts built after the earthquake in Nagata
ward (Mr. Ikenaga 2003, www.city.kobe.jp).
The land readjustment process causes dramatic change to the targeted areas
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from heavily damaged traditional areas characterized by high density, wooden structures
with limited vehicular access, to restructured and modern urban landscapes designed to
mitigate the effects of earthquake disasters. For example, the district illustrated in Figure
7 is about 8.5 ha large, and 97% of this area was destroyed by the earthquake. Through
the readjustment process, they have new fixed roads, wider than before the earthquake
and able to provide street parking. More importantly, the roads are wide enough to
mitigate the spread of fires and easier for emergency vehicle to get to their destination. A
number of amenities are included in the new districts, e.g. there are four parks (open
spaces) in this area and pedestrian roads. Smaller traditional buildings were replaced by
multi-unit structures capable of accommodating high density settlement. Five public
housing structures were built for the people who lost their houses because of the Hanshin
Awaji Earthquake.
Takatori District
One area subject to land readustment was Takatori District. The area is located in
Nagata Ward on the west side of Kobe, it experienced destruction from fire as well as
shaking. The district was particularly vulnerable because of the age, density, and
structural condition of the buildings, some of which had escaped the destruction of World
War II and the subsequent rebuilding. One thousand homes, the neighborhood
commercial street, a church, and other institutions were destroyed. Because of the extent
of the damage, and a desire to rebuild in ways that would reduce future vulnerability, land
readjustment was used in Takatori. Consultants with neighborhood ties led the
neighborhood planning groups in drawing new property boundaries resulting in bigger
lots and wider streets.
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Figure 6: Land Readjustment Process

www.city.kobe.jp

Figure 7§§: Land Readjustment in Nagata Ward

Source: www.city.kobe.jp

During the construction period, temporary structures housed businesses and the
§§

The number which are showed near the road are road width
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Catholic Church, which served as a center for ongoing relief activities (Ikenaga 2003,
Yamashita 2003, www.city.kobe.jp).
In addition to the property configuration, the consultants engaged in a lot-by-lot
examination of the district to identify opportunities for joint building and other
improvements.

In one case, a group of fourteen landowners pooled their land and the

Japan Housing Corporation (JHC) contributed construction funding. The resulting twentytwo unit condominium provided housing for all the landowners and eight units for the JHC
(Ikenaga 2003, Yamashita 2003, www.city.kobe.jp).
The neighborhood people and institutions made enormous efforts to maintain
normal life during the planning process, a task make more difficult since many residents
were living in temporary housing far from their homes. With the support of the church, an
artist in the congregation decorated surviving and temporary buildings with cheery
cartoon graphics that reflected the institutions and personalities of the district. The
community group organized a park improvement project, flower plantings, parties, and
festivals.

These events provided links to the displaced residents of the neighborhood

(Ikenaga 2003, Yamashita 2003, www.city.kobe.jp).
Some parts of the district found it easier to agree on a final plan and subareas
were created.

By the summer of 1996, approximately one third of the land readjustment

plans had been approved by landowners and the city. The city installed infrastructure and
owners were free to rebuild on their newly configured lots. The rest were completed in
September 1997 (Ikenaga 2003, Yamashita 2003, www.city.kobe.jp).
Happy Active Town: New Eastern City Center
Before the earthquake, plans for new development on the land occupied by Kobe
Steel and Kawasaki Steel were underway. Since 1990, Kobe City and the steel
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companies had been developing plans to replace the outmoded steel factories with a
mixed-use commercial development, The New Eastern City Center, also called HAT
(Happy Active Town). The proposed plans usesd land readjustment to reconfigure the
land for development, creating lots and setting aside land for roads and open space. The
two-phase project was to include about 3,000 market-rate residential units, commercial
space, and a research center anchored by a proposed World Health Organization
facilities (Ikenaga 2003, Yamashita 2003, www.city.kobe.jp).
After the earthquake these plans were refocused. While still a mixed-use
development, post-earthquake plans called for more housing to be built sooner. The
project now includes the WHO Kobe Center completed in 1998 and designed by Kenzo
Tange (the decision to come to Kobe was made after the earthquake), as well as cultural
and educational facilities and 10,000 residential units. The first phase involved the 1)
construction of 7,000 housing units, about 4,000 of which were subsidized by various
agencies for people with low incomes, and, 2) creation of waterfront open space capable
of serving as a disaster transportation base. Temporary housing residents had priority for
this housing. The second phase, replacing a Sumitomo Rubber factory, contains 3,000
residential units (Ikenaga 2003, Yamashita 2003, www.city.kobe.jp).
The rapid building of housing at HAT was made easier because the land was in the
process of being vacated, there were few owners, and there were no residents to
displace. It was also possible because Japanese government agencies and semi- public
agencies, like the Japanese Housing Corporation, have long been actively involved in
building high-density housing and have the skills to build a lot of housing. No residents of
Eastern City Center were displaced by the earthquake (Ikenaga 2003)
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Chapter V
Conclusion
Before the 1995 earthquake, experts and government officials understood, to
varying degrees, that seismic hazards needed to be mitigated in Kobe City. Many public
and private programs resulted in hazard reduction, especially fire hazard, either through
the replacement of older buildings and rearrangement of building patterns, or in fewer
cases, by retrofitting buildings. New building and construction standards resulted in
generally successful new buildings.
However, the places where hazardous conditions remained were the areas
where people with the fewest resources lived and worked, where government recovery
programs are least effective, and where pre-disaster community planning efforts were
weakest. They included areas where the cultural traditions were strong, the population
was aging, and change was not always welcome. Before 1995, the financial and social
costs of hazard reduction measures in some of these neighborhoods would have been
substantial. After the earthquake, recovery was difficult and costly in social as well as
economic terms.
In first world societies, engineers, geologists, geographers, and architects have
provided the technical ability to reduce earthquake hazards. Their financial and social
systems, which place great value on the enormous investments that they have made in
their physical cities, present more difficult hurdles for mitigation. Those with the fewest
options for reducing risks often face the greatest risks. While they know how to engineer
a safer environment, they have not developed the approaches to risk reduction that
address these financial and social issues.
Over time the line between post-disaster planning and the regular planning
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process fades, and the post-disaster issues merge with pre-disaster issues. An example
of this is the master planning process. Kobe City was in the process of preparing a
master plan when the earthquake hit. Its goals and projects were reexamined before the
master plan was released after the earthquake. However, many of the problems that had
been identified still remained: an aging population, obsolete industrial plants, and a need
to encourage emerging economic sectors. The city government continued to value many
of the goals and projects that had been planned before the earthquake.
Rebuilding emerged from pre-disaster conditions, plans, attitudes, and ideas.
The civic decision-making process remained in place, with adjustments. Where there
were few decision-makers involved, for example in HAT or the rebuilding of the
transportation infrastructure, recovery proceeded quickly. However, when the planning
process was a complex one, with many players with different interests, it often took a long
time to arrive at a solution. The land readjustment process can be long and contentious.
While some short cuts were made in the process, both the short cuts and the usual
complexity of land readjustment were resented at times.
In areas where plans for change were already underway, for example HAT, plans
could be reexamined in light of new needs and slanted more towards housing. Another
example, as mentioned earlier, was the proposed new Kobe airport, a controversial
project that many viewed as an expensive and unnecessary pet project of city
government. It remained in the Recovery Plan as a way to promote economic recovery.
People who think a course of action is wise before a disaster probably favor it after a
disaster, those who thought it foolish before the disaster are even more convinced by the
new competing needs. For both HAT and Kobe airport, the disaster was one step in a
long planning process.
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In places where residents have a strong attachment to the way things were and
resistance to changes that might have resulted even before a disaster, there are those
who will still want to rebuild in the old patterns and will oppose change, even if it might
reduce hazards. If a long-term vision can be articulated before a disaster, it might help
reduce conflicts and resentments like those that emerged during post-earthquake
planning in Kobe. Of course, the survival of ideas from before the earthquake resulted in
some blaming the city for using the earthquake as an excuse to push pre-earthquake
plans.
The lesson to city planners and government is that planning must be an ongoing
process. Having an active planning process that is publicly accepted and in place before
disaster will set the stage for effective post-disaster planning. Cities should maintain a
comprehensive plan with long-term goals that transcend disasters, and mid-term projects
that can be adjusted if conditions radically change.
After a disaster, cities do not have time to develop new planning techniques for
recovery. The basic planning infrastructure at hand, including processes, information, and
ideas, will form the basis of post-disaster planning. A primary tool of Japanese city
planning is land readjustment. This process worked well for Kobe City in the New Eastern
City center, where there were few landowners with large holdings. It was more
troublesome in neighborhoods with many small landowners, where the decision making
process was long, the residents and owners dispersed, and the concept of contributing
land for community purposes not always accepted by property owners with very small
lots. Because there was no alternative process available for rebuilding shattered
neighborhoods in ways that met private and collective needs, the process has been
lengthy. Some have argued to keep their old building patterns, which may continue to
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present hazards in the future.
A disaster is a blow to an entire community. It is important to recognize the
symbols of the community, respect the memory of the disaster, and celebrate the efforts
of recovery. It is also important to share information about the community and its
experience, both with the local citizens and with people from outside of the area.
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